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1 Introduction
My aim in this paper is to flesh out Iris Murdoch’s idea of moral perception and to 
put it in conversation with contemporary debates. The reason for doing so is that 
Murdoch proposes a radical account of moral perception which is not fully accounted 
for in recent discussions in analytic philosophy. The difficulties about moral percep-
tion depend on an assumption that true perception takes as its object a reality that is 
a) physical and b) non-moral.1 Defending some form of moral perception has gen-
erally consisted in explaining how moral properties are linked to such perceptual 
content proper. This has mainly been done by appealing to implicit principles or to 
moral concepts that function as bridges between phenomenal content and the real 
object of perception; these are not, however, defenses of moral perception per se, but 
rather explanations of the phenomenology of it.2 Or it has been done by establishing 
a closer link between the moral and the non-moral, through appeal to supervenience.3
Murdoch’s account, on the other hand, depends on a metaphysics which ques-
tions the very distinction between the moral and the non-moral, and thus supports 
the possibility of direct perception of moral properties without the need for either 
 * Silvia Panizza 
 S.Panizza@uea.ac.uk
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1 See David Faraci, “A Hard Look at Moral Perception,” Philosophical Studies 172:8 (2015): 2055-
2072; Andrew Cullison, “Moral Perception,’” European Journal of Philosophy 18:2 (2010): 159–75; 
Robert Audi, Moral Perception (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); Micheal Watkins and 
Kelly Dean Jolley, “Pollyanna Realism: Moral Perception and Moral Properties,” Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 80:1 (2002): 75–85; Pekka Väyrynen, “Doubts about Moral Perception,” in A. Bergqvist and 
R. Cowan (eds.) Evaluative Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
2 See Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, USA, 1977); Faraci, op. cit.; Väyrynen, op. cit.
3 See Timothy Chappell, “Moral Perception,” Philosophy 83:4 (2008): 421–37; A.E. Denham, “Envi-
sioning the Good: Iris Murdoch’s Moral Psychology,” Modern Fiction Studies 47:3 (2001): 602-629; 
Margaret Holland, “Touching the Weights: Moral Perception and Attention,” International Philosophical 
Quarterly 38:3 (1998): 299-312.
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implicit bridges or supervenience – both of which rest on the recognition of an onto-
logical gap between the moral and the non-moral. If direct moral perception is pos-
sible, we then have a different and more straightforward method of accounting for 
moral knowledge. However, a defense of moral perception does not need to claim 
either that a) all moral knowledge is acquired by perception, or that b) moral per-
ception is always correct. It is sufficient to show that it is possible to acquire moral 
knowledge through direct perception, without it being exhaustive or always success-
ful. This involves, crucially, the possibility of evaluating the correctness of percep-
tion. In the course of this discussion, I will be using “moral perception” as a success 
term, to indicate the perception of something which is there to be perceived.4
2  Moral Perception in Iris Murdoch
Despite arguing for moral perception at various points in her work, Murdoch only 
offers one sustained example of what she means by it, through the famous story of 
M and D, where little detail is provided as to how perception occurs. Here is a sum-
mary of the story (with apologies to the reader who is excessively familiar with it), 
introduced in The Sovereignty of Good: M is a mother in law who has always judged 
her daughter in law D harshly, finding her (in Murdoch’s words) “vulgar” and “juve-
nile;” then, with the passing of time, she starts questioning her view of D, realizing 
that she may have been biased or blinded by self-concern, and as a result she comes 
to have a very different view of her daughter in law, whom she now describes as 
“refreshingly simple.”5
Murdoch uses this story primarily in order to show how moral change can be 
inner change, by which she means involving no action at all, in opposition to the 
behaviorist model that was prevalent at the time she was writing. What is character-
istic of this change, presented as an example (if not a paradigm) of moral progress, 
is that it occurs through a process that Murdoch calls “looking again” and is said to 
result in a more accurate vision of D: “When M is just and loving,” Murdoch writes, 
“she sees D as she really is.”6
Several questions arise from this story. For our purposes, the relevant ones are: 
Firstly, is it really possible to say that M’s perception of D is what has changed, or is 
the talk of vision merely metaphorical? Secondly, the story involves the claim that 
M’s change is a change towards greater accuracy, implying that there is a fact of the 
matter about whether D is juvenile or refreshingly simple. How is this implication 
explained?
5 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970).
6 Ibid., p. 37.
4 It is controversial whether Murdoch uses the phrase in the same way. Perception-related words like 
“seeing,” “looking,” “attention,” are sometimes used as success-words, sometimes neutrally. For a full 
discussion of this question see Blum (Note viii).
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3  Two Meanings of Moral Perception
A first distinction to be made concerns the meaning of “moral perception.” Moral 
perception can refer to two different phenomena: first, it can be the idea that there is 
a morally relevant reality which can be revealed by perception; second, it can refer 
to the notion that one’s perceptions are expressive of one’s moral qualities and there-
fore correct perception depends on a morally good quality of consciousness, on vir-
tuous attitudes and states of mind.7 It has been suggested by S.W. Clifton that this 
second way is how Murdoch understands moral perception; the ability to perceive 
correctly or clearly, he argues, is inherently valuable, being a “moral achievement” 
whatever its object.8
While this interpretation certainly captures one aspect of moral perception as 
construed by Murdoch, it also obscures the real reason for evaluating particular 
perceptive states. Drawing on Simone Weil,9 Murdoch calls the state of receptivity 
leading to successful moral perception “attention.”10 Attention can be considered a 
virtue, and that is why, as Clifton argues, attention is good in itself, because it is part 
of good character and involves other virtues like selflessness and love and justice.11 
However, the moral importance of attention, or the virtuous aspect of attention, do 
not merely depend on making sure we are in a virtuous state involving clarity and 
honesty, but rather on making sure that we are seeing what is really there, not for our 
own sake, but for the sake of whatever it is that we are seeing – including the ability 
to focus on what is more important. The first and foremost reason for paying atten-
tion, in other words, is that the object, somehow, matters. As Murdoch stresses: “the 
direction of attention is outward, away from self.”12
These points emerge, for instance, in Murdoch’s comments on the Zen practice of 
meditation. Seeing stones and insects lovingly, justly and accurately is an exercise of 
virtue and, as such, it is a good thing to do. But part of its value depends, on the one 
hand, on the value of truth and reality, and on the other, on the fact that meditation is 
good training for seeing clearly other things that matter: after the practice, one needs 
7 This distinction is drawn by Scott W. Clifton, “Murdochian Moral Perception,” The Journal of Value 
Inquiry, 47 (2013): 207–220. It should be noted that the formulation “morally relevant reality” is neutral 
as to the existence of a moral reality, and also as to whether moral properties are perceived or inferred.
8 See Clifton, op. cit. and Lawrence Blum, “Visual Metaphors in Murdoch’s Moral Philosophy,” in J. 
Broackes (ed.), Iris Murdoch, Philosopher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 307-324.
9 See Sabina Lovibond, Iris Murdoch, Gender and Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 
2011), p. 28-46; and Kate Larson, Everything Important is to do with Passion’: Iris Murdoch’s Concept 
of Love and its Platonic Origin (Uppsala: Universitetsbiblioteket, 2009).
10 In The Sovereignty of Good (Note v, p. 34), Murdoch acknowledges the borrowing from Weil and 
refers to her thought at various places in her own work, although she never discusses at any length the 
extent to which she is indebted to Weil. Nonetheless, it is clear that Weil’s concept of attention, devel-
oped in the context of mysticism and religious metaphysics, had a tremendous influence on Murdoch, 
who secularized it and inserted it within her own Platonist metaphysics. For a discussion of Weil’s influ-
ence on Murdoch, see Lovibond and Larson (Note ix).
11 See Micheal Brady, “Virtue, Emotion, and Attention,” in A. T. Marsoobian et  al (eds.) Virtue and 
Vice, Moral and Epistemic (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011) and Nicolas Bommarito, “Modesty as a 
Virtue of Attention,” The Philosophical Review 122-1 (2013): 93–117.
12 Murdoch 1970, op. cit., p. 66.
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to return to the world.13 The importance of observing stones and insects lovingly, 
Murdoch suggests, lies partly in its ability to train oneself to thus see other people, 
animals, and situations.14 It seems like an inversion of priority to claim, instead, that 
“what makes attention … a moral achievement is not found in the specific cases in 
which an agent is able to see the suffering of others, but in all cases in which the 
agent sees the world aright as a result of the suppression of self’.”15 Adopting this 
view would, besides obscuring the reasons why the virtues involved in attention are 
considered to be virtues, shift the focus of attention onto the subject, at the expense 
of the reality outside the subject, which is the proper object of attention.
Murdoch, in fact, combines the two senses of “moral perception” – the moral 
quality of the perceiving mind and the moral quality of the perceived reality – in a 
way that makes them indivisible. Let us see how.
4  When Moral Perception Goes Wrong
Since Murdoch’s own example of moral perception has been criticized for being 
too “domestic” or private, and distant from pressing moral concerns, let us take two 
other examples where such concerns are unquestionably clear.
In April 2015, The Sun columnist Katie Hopkins published a piece in response 
to the sinking of a refugees’ vessel off the Libyan coast resulting in over 400 deaths. 
The article represents a view that is still present in certain sections of public dis-
course. Under the headline “Rescue boats? I’d use gunships to stop migrants,” Hop-
kins wrote:
No, I don’t care. Show me pictures of coffins, show me bodies floating in 
water, play violins and show me skinny people looking sad. I still don’t care … 
These migrants are like cockroaches … Drilling a few holes in the bottom of 
anything suspiciously resembling a boat would be a good idea, too.16
This contemporary example can be put side by side with a parable, used by Simone 
Weil to illustrate how attention and moral perception work: the parable of the Good 
Samaritan.17 While the Levite and the priest walk past with only a glance, the 
Samaritan stops to help the injured man by the side of the road (Luke 10:29-37).
Both of these are cases where something seems to go wrong in some of the par-
ticipants’ moral responses. Let us examine the possibility that in both, instead of 
moral progress by perception, as in the story of M and D, we have what Murdoch 
may describe as moral failure. What goes wrong and why – specifically, whether 
13 This is the upshot of Murdoch’s discussion and may not necessarily be an accurate representation of 
Zen philosophy, on which she is drawing. It is also a reflection of the Platonic influence on Murdoch’s 
thought: in this passage, the Zen sage is similar to the philosopher in Plato’s Republic who, having con-
templated the Good, returns to the cave.
14 See Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992).
15 Clifton, op. cit., pp. 211-212.
16 Katie Hopkins, “Rescue Boats? I’d Use Gunships to Stop Migrants,” The Sun, 17 April 2015.
17 See Simone Weil, Waiting on God, trans. E. Craufurd (Glasgow: Collins, 1978), p. 103.
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the moral failure can be understood as a failure of perception – are the questions at 
hand.
On the non-cognitivist, non-perceptual model (famously advocated, among oth-
ers, by R.M. Hare18, who is one of the main targets of Murdoch’s critique), the 
examples are to be analyzed in terms of perception of non-evaluative facts (presum-
ably spelled out roughly as: “people attempting to illegally migrate to Europe and 
drowning while doing so;” “an injured man lying by the side of the road;” etc.) plus 
the application of principles to those facts (e.g. “immigration to one’s country must 
be prevented;” “one is not morally required to stop and help a stranger;” etc.), which 
yield moral conclusions – according to Hare’s theory, in the form of a prescription 
(“do whatever you can to stop immigration;” “do not stop to help a stranger;” etc.).
If we assume for the sake of argument that what is going on in the cases of Hop-
kins and of the Levite is morally problematic, Hare’s model would explain the flaw 
as arising either from incorrect principles, or from the incorrect application of prin-
ciples to the specific situation, resulting in incorrect prescriptions.
5  Doubts About Moral Perception
This interpretation would fit with doubts raised in recent discussions of the possi-
bility of actual (direct) moral perception, discussions which at the same time try 
to do justice to the phenomenology of moral perception. These theories propose 
a model where the experience of perceiving moral properties is explained by the 
existence of “moral bridge principles” (Faraci),19 or “habitual implicit inferences or 
transitions in thought” (Väyrynen)20 or psychologically immediate judgments made 
on the basis of how things appear (Harman)21. According to this group of views, 
although we think, say, that we see kindness in a face, it is in fact a thought, formed 
independently of the perceptual experience, that links with the experience to create 
this impression. The moral component does not come from the perception itself, but 
from elsewhere.
Murdoch gives us ways to counter this proposed model in a simpler, more imme-
diate manner, by putting forth a view of perception which is inherently conceptual, 
thus denying a neat separation between (moral) thoughts on the one hand, and per-
ception on the other. Her alternative begins by urging us to question the idea that all 
the parties involved have the same perception of the relevant facts, those upon which 
deliberation is supposed to take place. Whether, for example, Hopkins has actually 
perceived the refugees and their situation in the same way as someone who takes it 
as imperative to rescue and help them.
Minimally, we can notice that the situation presents itself to Hopkins differently 
from the way it does to other observers. The words she uses (notably “cockroaches”) 
18 See R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952).
19 See Faraci, op. cit.
20 See Väyrynen, op. cit.
21 See Harman, op. cit.
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as well as statements such as “I don’t care” (implying: “there is no moral demand for 
care”), are emotional-evaluative and suggest that the facts at hand merit a particular 
response.22 Further, Hopkins presents a situation where some aspects are present 
or foregrounded, and other otherwise-perceivable ones are ignored. What she takes 
as salient in the refugees’ situation is that they are coming to another country unin-
vited, seeking for a share of the comfort which did not originally legally belong to 
them. The focus on this aspect, to the exclusion of many others, including the rea-
sons for the journey, what they are fleeing, their fear, etc. contributes to the picture 
of refugees as threatening, invading nuisances, to whom nothing is owed.
One problem with this picture is that it is limited: the refugees are indeed seeking 
a share of Europe’s safer life and some Europeans are concerned about losing some 
of their resources because of it; but seeing only this aspect excludes other, highly 
relevant aspects of the situation, such as the desperation, fear, and danger that are 
part of the refugees’ lot and which could be relieved. Another problem is that, by 
ignoring or suppressing something which is there (the fear, the danger, the pain) 
Hopkins’s perception, such as I have described it, offers an unrecognizable descrip-
tion of what it is for a person to be in a desperate situation (indeed, she refuses 
to use words that signal humanity), and at the same time blocks the responses that 
go naturally with ordinary perceptions of other living beings in distress. Something 
similar could be said about the biblical story. Removing certain aspects does not 
only yield an incomplete picture; it yields a false one.
It then seems that a key moral difference between Hopkins and, say, someone 
who takes the refugees as suffering human beings in need of help and rescue, lies 
in what Hopkins takes the refugees to be, and in the resulting claim that they make 
– and the claims they do not make – on her. Hopkins is not saying, for instance, that 
the refugees are facing a dreadful situation but, unfortunately, helping them would 
require the use of resources that are due by a certain idea of social contract only to 
citizens of the U.K. She is saying that refugees are not the kind of beings that elicit 
concern or compassion.
This interpretation of the given examples does not, as yet, negate the models pre-
sented above according to which moral perception is merely apparent. The sceptic 
about moral perception could accept what has been said so far but point out that 
what we have just observed only refers to the phenomenology of perception. It is 
still possible that what presents itself as fact is really an independent perception 
mediated by judgments, or judgments supervening on perceptions. But Murdoch 
goes further.
22 It is, of course, highly questionable that cockroaches themselves should be seen as mere nuisances to 
be killed off without a thought.
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6  Concepts in Perception
The alternative model presented by Murdoch asks us to observe experience and the 
concepts we use, as briefly shown above. First, observing moral disagreement leads 
to perplexity about the possibility of settling even the facts: if perception can be per-
ception of facts, so that one can be said to perceive the facts correctly or not, and if 
in moral disagreement it is not always possible to agree on the facts, then to under-
stand moral disagreement we need to also look at perception. Second, concept-use 
is involved in all aspects of moral understanding and discussion in a way that goes 
very deep. Facts are described by using concepts. But 1) which concepts we use, and 
2) how we understand specific concepts, both depend on what we take to be impor-
tant or relevant, what we have learned, in short, what Murdoch calls “background 
moral attitudes:”
There would, indeed, scarcely be an objection to saying that there were “moral 
facts” in the sense of moral interpretations of situations where the moral con-
cept in question determines what the situation is, and if the concept is with-
drawn we are not left with the same situation or the same facts. In short, if 
moral concepts are regarded as deep moral configurations of the world, rather 
than as lines drawn round separable factual areas, then there will be no facts 
“behind them” for them to be erroneously defined in terms of.23
The first thing we need to do, with Murdoch, is to show that at least some moral 
concepts are indeed essential to the correct description of a situation, so that, as she 
writes, without using them the situation is no longer presented as the same situation. 
If that can be shown to be the case, the second move for perception to count as prop-
erly (immediately) moral, will involve showing that concepts, including moral ones, 
can figure non-inferentially in perception.
The moral concepts that Murdoch has in mind here are clearly what were later 
called “thick” concepts by Bernard Williams – who, after all, claims to have first 
heard the “anti-disentanglement” idea, i.e. the idea that some concepts cannot be 
divided in an evaluative and a descriptive component, from Murdoch herself at 
Oxford.24 Thick concepts are the basic building blocks of ethical discourse for Mur-
doch, and in The Sovereignty of Good she goes as far as suggesting that “all the 
moral work” can be done by thick concepts.25
For Murdoch, virtually all concepts are both descriptions of the world and expres-
sive of the sensibility of the concept users. Concepts are, at the same time, deeply 
contextual and world related. She writes: “we learn through attending to contexts, 
23 Iris Murdoch, “Vision and Choice in Morality,” in P. Conradi (ed.), Existentialists and Mystics: Writ-
ings on Philosophy and Literature (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1999) p. 95, emphasis added.
24 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), p. 218.
25 Murdoch 1970, op. cit., p. 42.
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vocabulary develops through close attention to objects, and we can only understand 
others if we can to some extent share their contexts.”26
7  Murdoch’s Realism
Murdoch develops her view of concepts as part of her argument supporting moral 
realism. In arguing for the existence of a moral reality, Murdoch combines the epis-
temological question of how such reality is accessed with the ontological question 
about its nature. She combines, in other words, the two senses of moral perception 
presented above: moral perception considered as the evaluative nature of perception, 
and as perception of the moral nature of reality.27
Moral reality, in Murdoch’s thought, drawing significantly on Plato, divides into 
two kinds: the thin Good or guiding ideal, and thick moral facts and moral proper-
ties in the world. The Good is not perceptible due to its nature as an ideal.28 A lim-
ited grasp of the Good is made possible through the perception of moral properties 
in the world, which act as hints or assembled suggestions of the idea of the Good. 
This is an exceedingly brief summary of a complex metaphysics, but what is impor-
tant for our purposes is the appeal to experience: we look at the world, and discover 
therein valuable things as well as their relationships to each other and to something 
absolute (the idea of perfection or the Good); at the same time, the discovery of the 
absolute is the discovery of something which governs the whole of reality, the world 
and the mind; that indicates that all our acts of cognition are in one way or another 
structured by an orientation to the Good.29
So, on the one hand, cognition and consciousness are inherently evaluative; on 
the other, value governs not only the mind but also the world – it is not projected, 
as the anti-realist would have it, by the mind onto the world. Murdoch offers two 
reasons to think that our evaluating consciousness does not, at the same time, create 
or project value. First, the mind forms a sense of value through its encounter with 
the world. The idea of the Good is not a priori, but constantly refined based on what 
one sees out there. Even the supposedly bridging judgments would not exist without 
prior perceptions. Second, the claim that the mind perceives reality through moral 
structures does not need to entail that what is perceived as a moral fact is not part of 
reality, or that it is a distortion of it. Rather, the mind uses (evaluating) concepts to 
grasp a reality which is “out there” and separate, but which cannot be grasped inde-
pendently of those structures. Concepts are like eyes: we see through them, but what 
we see is not in them. The testing ground of all acts of consciousness, as Murdoch 
26 Ibid., p. 32. This line of thinking has been developed by McDowell (Note xxxii), who argues that con-
cept application is something that can only be learned from within a community of concept users, which 
involves to some extent sharing their concerns, including moral concerns.
27 See Maria Antonaccio, Picturing the Human: The Moral Thought of Iris Murdoch (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) and David Robjant, “The Earthy Realism of Plato’s Metaphysics, or: What Shall 
We Do with Iris Murdoch?” Philosophical Investigations 35 (2012): 43–67.
28 Murdoch 1999, op. cit., p. 95.
29 This is discussed at length in Chapter 13 of Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (Note x).
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puts it, is the world. So the testing ground of moral perception will be the reality that 
it takes in.30
In this way, Murdoch also combines two important intuitions: the intuition that 
we construe situations in particular ways, depending on our values, interests and so 
on; and the intuition that there is a moral truth that is not projected by the mind. Her 
suggestion is to think of consciousness and perception not as passive instruments 
affected by an external reality, but rather as tools for interacting with reality to form 
knowledge: in her own words, not as “mirroring” the world, but as “grasping” it.31
8  Implications for Moral Perception
This model of perception has important implications. First, by configuring concepts 
as reaching both to the world and to the mind, it supports the “anti-disentanglement” 
view of thick concepts, defended by McDowell, according to which some concepts 
(such as “kind,” “cruel,” but also “cockroach” as used above) are both descriptive 
and evaluative at the same time, and without the evaluative aspect the concept would 
no longer be the same – it would no longer describe the same kind of reality.32
Further, Murdoch’s model as described above supports the idea that moral con-
cepts are not special kinds of concepts that refer to special kinds of properties or 
facts, but they are concepts like any other, which in particular contexts and uses 
take on a more or less explicit moral significance. It follows that we cannot draw 
neat boundaries around what counts as moral, either in reality or among con-
cepts.33 If Murdoch’s general picture of the concept-using mind is accepted, the 
distinction between facts and values begins to blur.34 Even in perception, the most 
basic encounter between mind and world, the world does not present itself to us 
brutely as unconceptualized sense-data, but via an evaluative concept-using activ-
ity. As Murdoch writes: “our deepest imaginings which structure the world in which 
‘moral judgments’ occur are already evaluations. Perception itself is a mode of 
30 What I have just offered is my interpretation of Murdoch’s metaphysics, but it is by no means uncon-
troversial. In fact, this delicate balance between idealism and realism is probably the main scholarly con-
troversy regarding Murdoch’s philosophy. The classic reading is that of Antonaccio (Note xxvii), who 
attributes to Murdoch a “reflexive realism” where moral reality exists but needs to be apprehended also 
through self-observation. While Antonaccio is careful to maintain a realist element, her overall position 
is difficult to combine with Murdoch’s constant emphasis on the reality outside of the self. Robjant (Note 
xxvii) has argued against this position in favour of a more robust realism. The interpretation here pre-
sented is more closely aligned to the latter view.
31 Ibid., p. 41.
32 See John McDowell, “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following,” in Mind, Value and Reality (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001): 198-218.
33 As Cora Diamond (see Note xxxiv) argues , if we follow Murdoch, strictly speaking, value is not 
really like fact, but prior to fact: the domain of the moral is different from other domains because it is 
what shapes them. The very distinction between fact and value, therefore, follows this pattern. Given this 
framework, however, facts and values can converge again, as both are discerned by the evaluating mind.
34 See also Cora Diamond, “‘We are Perpetually Moralists’: Iris Murdoch, Fact and Value,” in M. 
Antonaccio and W. Schweiker (eds.) Iris Murdoch and the Search for Human Goodness (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 79-109.
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evaluation.”35 This is how, for example, we can say that the mother in law came to 
“see” the daughter in law differently, or that by conceptualizing the situation in dif-
ferent ways, the Samaritan and the Levite perceived something different in the man 
lying by the side of the road, or again that Hopkins’s perception of what refugees are 
is not something that can be addressed by arguing about moral principles.
The idea that concepts reach all the way down to perception has been defended 
more recently from different angles. Here I can only mention three approaches 
which, while different form Murdoch’s, end up forming a similar picture.
The possibility that perception operates through concepts is supported by John 
McDowell.36 He argues that the possibility of having perception-based beliefs, taken 
as manifestations of rationality, must be explained by appealing to the rationality 
of the perception itself. In order to take perceptual experience as a reason in belief 
formation, the perception has to be rational. And to be rational, one must be able to 
respond to reasons as such, an ability that involves the deployment of conceptual 
capacities. To take the perception of a road sign as pointing to the right, conceptual 
abilities need to be in place.
From a rather different angle, recent developments in the philosophy of perception 
that build on theories of mental architecture also seem to offer plausible potential 
grounds for thinking of perception as conceptually rich. These new developments 
deny Fodor’s37 standard system, in which input (perceptual) systems are modular, 
which makes them reliant only on their own resources and unable to use informa-
tion available in higher cognitive systems, such as concepts. Fodor’s view supports 
the idea that we can only perceive simple or lower-level properties; but recently 
Carruthers38 and others following him39 have challenged Fodor’s rigid definition of 
modularity, proposing a cognitive architecture which allows for a progressive degree 
of cognitive penetration as different modules process and enrich the perceptual raw 
sense data, which are posted on a central “blackboard” and progressively modified 
through various experiences. This entails that modules can collaborate with other 
systems, so that when information is processed as perceptual information, it will be 
available as rich or higher order information.
This modular cognitive view supports the notion that, from yet a different angle, 
has recently been discussed under the heading of “cognitive penetration,” primarily 
by Susanna Siegel.40 Cognitive penetration is the possibility, in Siegel’s definition,
for two subjects (or for one subject in different circumstances) to have visual 
experiences with different contents while seeing and attending to the same 
35 Murdoch 1992, op. cit., pp. 314-315.
36 See John McDowell (2006), ‘Conceptual Capacities in Perception’, in G. Abel (ed.) Kreativität (Ham-
burg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2006).
37 See Jerry Fodor, The Modularity of Mind (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1983).
38 See Peter Carruthers, The Architecture of the Mind  (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006) and The Opacity of 
Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
39 See Jane Suilin Lavelle, “Is a modular cognitive architecture compatible with the direct perception of 
mental states?” Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015): 508-518.
40 See Siegel, The Contents of Visual Experience (Oxford University Press, 2010) and “Cognitive Pen-
etrability and Perceptual Justification,” Noûs 46-2 (2012): 201-221
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distal stimuli under the same external conditions, as a result of differences in 
other cognitive (including affective) states.41
Such cognitive states include moods, beliefs, knowledge, desires and the possession 
of particular concepts. While cognitive penetration can distort perception, as in the 
case, say, of seeing aggressiveness in a refugee’s demeanor because of one’s existing 
fears, it can also be epistemically beneficial – for instance, when the mother in law 
uses her refined understanding of “simplicity” and “love” to modify her perception 
of D.
The arguments just summarized work together to challenge the assumption 
that perceptual objects are only of a simple or lower-level nature and support the 
idea that perception can be of complex or higher-level properties and objects, like 
a human face or, indeed, a kind gesture. Another important consequence of these 
types of argument is that perception needs not be mediated by concepts or princi-
ples, as proposed by the more skeptical views on moral perception introduced ear-
lier, according to which concepts and principles are bridges between perception and 
knowledge, but not part of perception. On this Murdoch-inspired view, on the con-
trary, perception is not mediated, but enriched, by concepts.
The reader will have noticed, however, that the arguments presented in defense 
of direct moral perception in this section support the idea that we use concepts in 
perception, but not necessarily moral concepts. Yet, if we allow intellectual, i.e. con-
ceptual capacities to play a role in perception, why should this not be possible with 
moral concepts as well? To deny this possibility one would need to show that there 
is a fundamental difference between moral and non-moral concepts insofar as their 
ability to penetrate perception is concerned. Murdoch has offered reasons, explained 
above, to doubt this by pointing to the value-ladenness of consciousness. Her model 
allows us to address two common worries about considering moral concepts in per-
ception on a par with other concepts.
The first worry concerns the idea that moral concepts often require prior knowl-
edge, reflection, refinement, but that is not the case for concepts that allow us to 
recognise basic objects of perception – say tables and chairs. Therefore, if I “see” 
something differently after reflection and perhaps discussion, that cannot count as 
perception proper. Empirical concepts are applied immediately, moral concepts 
mediately. This assumed distinction is described by Jonathan Dancy as a “funda-
mental mistake in the philosophy of perception.”42 Dancy uses the example of the 
car mechanic, who can be described as hearing the malfunctioning of the water 
pump, rather than as just hearing a particular pattern of sounds and inferring the 
malfunctioning from it; something similar can be said about listening to a song, or 
to a conversation, or being able to taste the spiciness of a wine after a wine tasting 
course. All these are cases where experience, knowledge, familiarity with concepts 
41 Ibid., pp. 205-6.




and reflection modify perception and do so, importantly, in the direction of greater 
accuracy.
This is the phenomenon that Murdoch refers to as the “deepening of concepts,” 
particularly important in ethics, but discernible in every experience. Even when it 
comes to an apparently simple and very immediately applicable concept like “red,” 
Murdoch asks, “why not consider red as an ideal end point, a concept infinitely to be 
learned?”43 In some cases, as in the case of the artist trying to find the perfect shade 
of red for her painting, this may indeed be the case. And what about, indeed, the 
concept “human being” in the cases of Hopkins, and of the Levite and the priest? I 
shall return to this below.
The second worry about allowing moral concepts to figure in perception regards 
the requirement for moral concepts to be intrinsically motivating, which is sup-
posed to set them apart from non-moral concepts. Here again, we can appeal to the 
intrinsically motivating – or at least reason giving – nature, ceteris paribus, of the 
application of certain concepts usually regarded as empirical, such as “slippery” or 
“poisonous.” As Chappell has noted, the main point of perception is, in evolutionary 
terms, precisely that of engendering certain responses. If empirical concepts moti-
vate or give reasons in virtue of their use in human life, so can moral concepts such 
as “callousness” or “dignity.”44
9  Against Supervenience
While the distinctions just mentioned help us to compare two supposedly separate 
spheres, their point here, as well as Murdoch’s overall point, is that no such dis-
tinction can be drawn, at least not prior to the particular situation to be assessed. 
Because of the evaluative nature of consciousness, for Murdoch, any concept is 
potentially a moral one. (We can think, again, of the concept “red,” if used to talk 
about traffic lights, or about a person’s skin…) If concepts are human tools meant to 
grasp an external reality in human ways, which include evaluation, and if concepts 
can do so by shaping perception, then it also follows that we no longer need to find 
links or bridges between the supposedly separate perception of natural properties 
and that of moral properties.
This goes against not only skepticism about moral perception, but also many of 
its defenses, which typically appeal to supervenience as the connection between 
natural and moral properties, while assuming, nonetheless, a fundamental dis-
tinction between them. This is the defense of moral perception put forward more 
generally by Robert Audi45 and in the context of Murdoch’s philosophy by A.E. 
Denham (2001).46 Denham constructs a convincing case for the possibility of per-
ceiving moral properties, but does so based a distinction between moral properties 
43 Murdoch 1970, op. cit., p. 29.
44 See Chappell, op. cit.
45 See Audi, op. cit.
46 See Denham, op. cit.
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(and other properties, e.g. aesthetic ones) and the “base” properties which are nec-
essary for moral properties to be perceived. Base properties are natural properties. 
Moral properties depend on them in a relation of supervenience (when a difference 
in moral properties requires a difference in base properties). Denham calls super-
venient moral properties “aspectual” properties: they represent ways of seeing a 
particular situation. Aspectual or supervenient properties are indeed experienced 
as direct objects of perception, but upon analysis they can be found to supervene 
on other properties, which Denham identifies, in the moral case, with “other peo-
ple’s concerns and interests.”47 On this view, moral perception is possible because 
moral properties are not inferred from non-moral ones but apprehended together. At 
the same time, moral properties still depend on and differ from non-moral ones.48 
According to supervenience views, we perceive a face or a smile, but only in virtue 
of perceiving the lines that make them up: the lines are still primary. In terms of 
moral perception, supervenience theories would say that the perception of cruelty in 
a gesture is dependent on the perception of the physical components of the situation, 
but the two aspects are perceived together.
By Murdoch’s lights, however, whereby concepts enter perception in virtue of 
being “deep moral configurations of the world,”49 there is no reason to suppose that 
the concept of line is primary in relation to the concept of face, or that people’s con-
cerns are primary relative to the moral properties of the situations in which they fig-
ure. If moral concepts are human tools to “grasp,” in Murdoch’s language, the world, 
then perception reveals a world which is both moral and physical, and inextricably 
so. Murdoch’s attack on the fact/value distinction, starting from concept-use, does 
not answer but avoids the question: How do we explain why “injustice” or “cruelty” 
are attributed to “drilling holes in refugees’ boats”? In the context in which it is said, 
in the context in which it is heard, Hopkins’s suggestion can be immediately concep-
tualized in those ways, just as the perception of the physical action is immediately 
described as “drilling holes….” Murdoch would not see why one needs to be derived 
from the other. The supervenience model, often presented as the best description of 
Murdoch’s view of moral perception, fails to do justice to her view of perception as 
conceptual through and through, where the moral difference lies in what we see, and 
not only what we see things as.
10  Explaining What Goes Wrong
One immediate objection to the moral conceptualization just offered of Hopkins’s 
proposal is that not everyone would agree that “unjust” and “cruel” are the correct 
concepts to use there. Another, related objection, is that there may be many different 
47 Ibid., p. 613.
48 This model of moral perception can be found, fully fleshed out, in Robert Audi (see Note i) who, simi-
larly to Denham, holds that we perceive moral properties via the perception of their grounds, which are 
non-moral.
49 Murdoch 1999, op. cit., p. 95.
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concepts through which to perceive the situation. The latter is not overly concerning. 
As long as the concepts and the properties they capture are not among themselves 
incompatible, many ways of correctly conceptualizing the same reality are possible. 
On the other hand, disagreement, to which the first objection refers, is often posed 
as a problem in moral theory, especially in realist and intuitionist accounts of moral-
ity; but it may become less worrying if Murdoch can offer us a way to explain how 
one might perceive things in some ways that are closer to the truth, and others that 
are less so. If we return one final time to the opening examples, we can now more 
properly explain what is going wrong there by applying Murdoch’s model of moral 
perception and try to set aside at least some ways of seeing the situations presented.
The discussion of Murdoch’s thought highlighted the idea that (moral) concepts 
are necessary ways of framing the world, making it accessible to the mind. Many 
concepts, including but not only moral concepts, have a direct link to action, moti-
vation, or reasons for a particular action or stance. They are not, in other words, 
inert or merely contemplative. This links moral concepts to empirical ones, making 
them less special than one might think. Because concepts, whilst reaching to the 
world, are also products of the human mind and of human communities, they are not 
fixed but can be developed, through thought, analysis and experience, potentially ad 
infinitum.
Thus moral concepts, like other concepts, are amenable to correction, clarifica-
tion as well as distortion and avoidance. Moral concepts are refined, clarified and 
corrected, as Murdoch suggests, by looking both at the world which they are used 
to capture and at the people who use them.50 Murdoch’s important insight is that, 
in doing so, we should focus on the impediments to appropriate concept use – and 
therefore to clear vision – before focusing on the standards by which we can posi-
tively ascertain it.
Both Hopkins, and the priest and Levite, have reasons to distort or suppress the 
full application of, among others, the concepts of humanity, or fellow living being, 
to the refugees and the injured man respectively. Such failures are almost always 
motivated, according to Murdoch, by the presence of the “ego” or self-concern, 
understood very broadly as the human tendency whereby fear, desire, habit, and 
other self-protective cognitive states block full recognition of what confronts one. 
In these examples we can imagine, for instance, nationalistic self-protection in the 
case of Hopkins, and self-interested desire to arrive at one’s destination quickly in 
the case of the priest and the Levite, or, in both cases, the desire to avoid being 
confronted with the reality of suffering. In this case, the willful ignorance or denial 
may be motivated precisely by the awareness that deploying the right concepts in 
the right way would make a claim on one, coupled with the desire to avoid having to 
respond to such a claim.
This could be Murdoch’s analysis; but even if we reject the suggestion that self-
concern is the root of all distorted vision, it is possible to identify instances of faulty 
concept application in the cases under consideration. The suffering of other living 
beings normally presents itself prima facie as undesirable, painful, to be avoided. 
50 Murdoch 1970, op. cit., p. 32.
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It is only through either the suppression of one of these concepts (“living being,” 
“human being,” “suffering” …), or through a process of reasoning leading to the 
conclusion that other concerns should take priority, that suffering can be ignored, 
but in very different ways. The latter possibility indeed includes a prior recognition, 
followed by a (more or less appropriately) motivated rejection. That is not the case 
in our examples, where what is involved is a framing or vision of the other as not 
eliciting or meriting any of the responses naturally associated with others’ pain. In 
visual terms, it is a deflection of the gaze away from the full reality of the sufferer. 
The failures, in the examples at hand, are not just failures of judgment, but failures 
of fully appreciating the significance of what those human beings, in those contexts, 
are.
It is possible that there are cases where deflection may be desirable or necessary, 
for example if being confronted with intense pain is a threat to one’s sanity. Our 
examples do not seem to fall under this category either. What they seem to present is 
a refusal to observe a reality that is there and to be therefore claimed by that reality 
in one’s responses. They show a lack, as Simone Weil put it in relation to the Samar-
itan, of “the interval of hesitation” which signals that the other has been recognizes 
as other, fellow subject in a life but also independent of oneself and of one’s desires 
for things to be a certain way.51
The application and deepening of concepts requires particular faculties and atti-
tudes on the part of the subject, including what Murdoch and Weil called “atten-
tion:” the real moral work, in this framework, involves the removal of self-created 
impediments, as well as the active reaching out to reality in order to refine one’s 
concepts and be maximally receptive to the reality that shapes them.
11  Conclusion
I have presented an alternative model of the way the mind interacts with the world, 
drawn from Murdoch’s philosophy, to support the possibility of moral perception. 
Concept-application, on this view, is an integral part of the process of perception, 
and morality is seen as an essential aspect of concept-making. Accepting this picture 
has consequences, first and foremost, for moral knowledge, because it explains how 
moral knowledge can be achieved by evening out the field, so to speak, and applying 
the same model to the knowledge of both moral properties and what we consider to 
be non-moral properties. Claims to moral knowledge are then analyzed by looking 
at the process of perception and the perceiving agent, including the concepts used, 
rather than by attempting to settle empirical and moral properties independently of 
the participants.
This model takes moral disagreement seriously, but questions the assumption 
that disagreement must rest on the moral element alone, indeed questioning the pos-
sibility of separating the moral from the non-moral. Disagreement on this view is 
addressed through analysis of the individual perceivers, the concepts used, both in 




their public and private elements, and the whole world-view that shapes both the 
person and her concepts. This explains why, in some cases, moral disagreement can 
be radical, because based on irreconcilable perceptions of reality, which are not set-
tled by any appeal to principles. This is bad news for the hope that moral disagree-
ment can always be resolved, but Murdoch’s view does not leave us powerless in the 
face of it, even if the path to resolution is longer and more complex than the analysis 
of the consistency and rationality of moral principles alone.
A more positive consequence for moral disagreement also ensues: as we saw, if 
moral concepts shape the facts one perceives, it is also possible for there to be sev-
eral compatible but different perceptions in the same contexts, without it being a 
cause for worry. Reality can be captured and framed in different ways. At the same 
time, there will be perceptions that are not fitting. As Wittgenstein put it, “Say what 
you choose, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing the facts. (And when you 
see them there is a good deal that you will not say.)”52
In conclusion, Murdoch’s model seems to be one of the simplest ways of captur-
ing ordinary experience of the moral life without falling into contradictions. While 
I have attempted to present Murdoch’s view of moral perception as an alternative to 
a more widely accepted one, it is only possible to draw this contrast tentatively: it is 
part of Murdoch’s thought that work on moral concepts can only be done internally 
to a world where moral concerns are felt as real; so that perhaps those whose experi-
ence is truly of a world where the only real and perceptible objects are those of raw 
sense data discovered by empirical science, if they are there, may not be encoun-
tered quite on the same terms.
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